Liszt: Reply

Who shall be put in jail for the crimes against the
people of Ethiopia?
Ms. Finsen remarks. "In discussing the killing of a
healthy baboon in a laboratory experiment, Liszt says
that 'the agent which transported the violence is the
structure of science itself.' But this is only partially
right, for without individual willing experimenters no
baboons can be killed." But also this is only partly
right, for without us taxpayers and tablet-swallowers.
no experimenter would have work. Ms. Finsen's
procrustean solution is to hold some people responsible
for the sins of the multitude because the multitude
cannot be accommodated by the legal system. But this
will only create scapegoats. And the system will only
accommodate itself to this little attack through the
institution of liability insurance, etc.
Ms. Finsen rightly points out that at the Nuremberg
Trials individuals were hanged for their crimes. I'm
sure I needn't point out the fact that thousands went
unpunished and tens of thousands were implicated in
ways that might not be punishable: giving information
to the SS about the whereabouts of Jewish families;
not offering water to a thirsting prisoner, jeering at a
wearer of the yellow star; not wearing the yellow star
oneself as a sign of solidarity; not hiding a Jewish
person; not writing outraged letters to the newspapers;
not circulating flyers; taking up an academic position
vacated by a Jew carried off to the camps; buying a
house for a pittance which had been seized by the Nazis
from a Jewish family. The list is long and tragic. The
hangings of the few Nazis, who were picked out of the
mass of war criminals. can only be understood as the
expression of outrage and desperation. It was not
classic justice. The condemned were certainly guilty.
But they were also scapegoats. Germans today speak
sardonically of the executions, because the war
criminals still live among us here in Germany and the
majority continued unscathed in their climb to the top
of society. I used the example of the Nuremberg Trials
to show that the laws of the land may be immoral, that
individuals may be more moral than the laws of the
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In responding to Ms. Finsen's comments on my
paper, I am struck once again by how difficult it is to
keep deliberation upon the ideal separate from utilitarian
considerations. And although I feel that Ms. Finsen in
her comments does not always succeed in doing this
(or perhaps does not value the attempt) I am grateful
for her criticism, which is obviously propelled by a
fierce regard for animals. I have taken up my subject
out of desperation about the fate of laboratory and
factory farm animals and out of a deep admiration for
humans pure and determined enough to put themselves
in danger in order to rescue animals. I have attempted
in my paper, however. to avoid any discussion peripheral
to the point of whether the act of animal liberation can
have a claim to validity.

I. Structural Violence
Ms. Finsen reacts sharply to my assertion that in
structural violence the actor/act/victim relationship is
broken, and that the perpetrator of violence must not
be its author and that not the perpetrator is to be sought,
but rather the system must be changed. Ms. Finsen
cites my example of hunger in Ethiopia and rightly
remarks that the fact that we all know why it is
happening implicates us in the violence. She brings
her own example of the Exxon spill and pleads here for
the punishment of the corporate executives for their part
in the disaster. But why only the captain of the ship or
the president of the company? What about the
stockholders who are the financial supporters and the
beneficiaries of Exxon? What about all of us who use
oil and gasoline every day, who pollute our environment
and don't care in the least what this means for future
generations, or-if we care-still continue to use fossil
fuel? We are all guilty, so how shall we be punished?
Putting the president of Exxon in jail does not speak to
the Exxon spill. It is a case of amputating the dangling
legs of sleepers to make them fit in the inadequate bed
of common law. What about all the meat-eaters who
are implicated in the hunger in Ethiopia, who not only
know what the connections are, but continue their
destructive behavior? How shall we punish them?
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Given that we are not feral, this is true by defInition
and the very proof of my assertion that our legal
apparatus is inadequate to cope with structural violence.
Ms. Finsen stresses her belief that boycott and
passive resistance are more effective measures in
changing the structures of violence. But judging
methods of changing the structures is clearly not my
theme. I am judging animal liberation on the variables
of legitimacy, necessity, and aptness as a method of
righting the wrong being done to the individual animal
at rislc. Hiding a Jewish family in the attic in 1944 in
Hamburg was not an effective means of challenging
fascist ideology. But it was the only effective solution
for its victims.

land, and that resistance to immoral laws must be
treated differently than resistance to moral laws.
II. Defending the Liberation of Animals
Ms. Finsen says she has difficulty understanding my
"terminology" although I have used standard defInitions
for the terms I have used where I have not specifically
defined them otherwise.
I do, in fact, mean by the term "liberation" the
physical removal of animals from danger, the removal
"from harm's way."

1. Legitimacy

3. Aptness

By "valid" I mean "well-founded and particularly
applicable to the particular matter or circumstances"
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1975, p. 3586). With the
word "legitimate" I mean "conformable to law or rule;
sanctioned or authorized by law or right; lawful; proper"
(op. cit., p. 1600). By "law" and "right" I mean the
deepest and oldest sense of the words: natural law and
natural right as recognized at the Nuremberg Trials and
which, as I have tried to demonstrate, logically extend
to animals.
Ms. Finsen's claim that "that the Nazis could be held
responsible for their crimes has something to do with
the fact that they were violating a quite universally held
principle" is, frrstly, clearly untrue-the Nazis and the
German people for instance did not hold to this
principle-and, secondly, an invalid conclusion.
"Universally held principles" may be the basis for brute
force or "Faustrecht" but are not the basis for
determining the morality of an act

Ms. Finsen rightly remarks that animal liberation is
at least the most effective means to prevent injustice to
the particular animals involved. I have not tried to claim
more. Whether it is also effective in bringing the
problem of animal abuse before the public or whether
it may be a counterproductive measure in the end,
bringing the animal rights movement into the realm of
terrorism, is not my theme. Utilitarian considerations
are inappropriate to a paper concerned with the
"rightness" of animal liberation. These tactical
deliberations belong to discussions within the various
animal rights groups.

If You Really Care About
Animals, You Need
to Read The
ANIMALS' AGENDA

2. Necessity
The "necessity" of which I speak here-as I have
tried to demonstrate by referring to the animal
liberator's "more demanding moral framework" and
her "press of necessity"-is that necessity which only
becomes operant after a certain level of awareness is
reached. It is the "necessity" which I feel to keep meat
out of my body and house but which my neighbor Herr
Wedekind does not feel. I have not made a statement
to the effect that everyone is required to free animals,
but that for the liberator, it has become a necessity.
Ms. Finsen repeatedly stresses in her reply to this
section that we are all complicit in structural violence.

Fall 1990

From factory farming to Native trapping, from
endangered species to companion animals, we
cover the issues that are making animal rights a
malar movement of the 20th century.

(~1ll~1lf~~ $22 per year
~lGJ~~& ITen issues'
P.O. Bux 6809 • Syracuse, l'JY 13217

175

Between the Species

